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IAN BEZPALKO*

The Deep Seabed: Customary Law
Codified
ABSTRACT
Recognizing that a fragmented internationalpolicy regarding
the use of the seas did not serve well the global community and
jeopardized valuable environmental resources, the United
Nations undertook the task of codifying the Law of the Sea. The
Conventions, approved following U.N. Conferences on this law,
aim to eliminate conflict and to assure environmentally
responsible development of resources.
Although the United States and other technologically advanced
countries have not yet ratified the latest Convention on the Law
of the Sea, legitimate precedent in the Outer Space regime and a
contractual revision of res communis as a peremptory norm
eminently favor ratification. Pursuant to the Convention,
agreements intended to accommodate technologically advanced
countries specifically target the deep seabed. Regulations
promulgated by the InternationalSeabed Authority guaranteethe
organized and responsible exploitation of undersea minerals that
are beyond the jurisdictionof coastal states. The same regulations
allow for a controlled scientific study of the deep seabed and
providefor the collection of data in a single depositaryorgan.
The author contends that the choice of the United States to
position itself outside the legal framework developed by the
United Nations and its International Seabed Authority is
nothing less than shortsighted in view of the overarching aim to
preserve the seabed. But the United Nations must also recognize
that the "as is" rule presents undue constraints that can only
impede acceptance of what could prove to be a most useful tool in
the protection of the marineenvironment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Water is basic to life. No living cell can exist without it, and if we
were to view the earth as the living cell that it is,' the importance of the
* University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. 2004; University of New Mexico,
B.A. History, B.A. Philosophy, 2001. The author wishes to thank Professors G. Emlen Hall
and Franklin E. Gill for their comments and advice. Any errors or omissions are the
author's own.
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molecule with the single oxygen atom bonded to two hydrogen atoms
becomes plain. Water covers two-thirds of the earth's surface and,
together with the water vapor in the atmosphere, makes this a "blue
planet" when viewed from space. Yet, the vast "blue" remained
unexplored until fairly recently in human history. Although the world's
seas are no longer uncharted, their systematic exploration is only now
being undertaken due to sufficiently developed equipment. Throughout
history, humans have been fascinated with tools. Technology has been a
2
partner in the world community's progression through the ages. To
borrow a phrase from Adam Smith, the "invisible hand" of technology
has crossed borders. In the process, technology has significantly affected
international law. 3 Innovations necessitated new laws, and this is
especially true in one of the newest frontiers, the deep seabed.
Nations have grappled with the issues involved in maritime
exploration since navigation first became possible. Vastness of the seas
and the perceived inexhaustibility of their resources gave rise to the
concept of "common heritage of mankind." But the path to this
understanding was not entirely even throughout history. Disputes over
sea rights led Carthage to prevent Romans from washing their hands in
4
the Sicilian Sea, a contributing cause to the Punic Wars. Nevertheless,
the common heritage of mankind concept became established as a
peremptory norm-jus cogens- in international law. Its axiomatic nature
defies amendment according to some, while others argue that it remains
inexact and unbefitting the current state of progress in maritime
activities.5 Furthermore, along with advanced navigational capability
came scientific evidence that proved marine resources to be finite and
destructible, prompting international action toward cooperation in the
maintenance of these resources.
Multilateral efforts to develop international policy regarding the
use of the seas culminated in the third U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea, which addressed, inter alia, the problems of conservation and

1.

LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL: NOTES OF A BIOLOGY WATCHER 170 (1974).

2. Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 151 (2001).
3. Id.
GEORGE V. GALDORISI & KEVIN R. VIENNA, BEYOND THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEW
4.
DIRECTIONS FOR U.S. OCEANS POLICY 121 (1997).

5. Craig H. Allen, Protecting the Oceanic Gardens of Eden: International Law Issues in
Deep-Sea Vent Resource Conservationand Management, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 563, 633
(2001); Martin A. Harry, The Deep Seabed: The Common Heritage of Mankind or Arena for
Unilateral Exploitation?, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 207 (1992). See also Christopher C. Joyner, Legal
Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritageof Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190, 199
(1986).
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allocation involved in mining the deep seabed. The Convention that
emerged from that effort awaited ratification for 12 years, but the
framework needed to achieve the objective of creating "favorable
conditions for peace and order in the oceans" 6 had been established.
Other treaties and declarations complement this framework as lex lata or
lexferenda to state, respectively, what the international law is or ought to
be. 7 Under the auspices of the United Nations, continuing work by the
International Seabed Authority has begun to bear fruit through
regulations approved in July of 2000. To a large extent, these Regulations
on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area 8
codify customary law pertaining to the deep seabed. In addition, the
Regulations impose environmental responsibility that should be heeded
by any residual conflicting mining interests in the United States and
elsewhere in order to safeguard the blue planet, our "common heritage,"
for future generations.
To place the Regulations in historical context, a brief overview of
the law of the sea is provided in part II of this article. Part III examines
the U.S. position in international negotiations regarding the deep seabed.
Part IV introduces the reader to the geography and geology of the deep
seabed and one particular resource to be found there, the polymetallic
nodule. Part V deals with sovereignty issues, while part VI analyzes the
Regulations now in place for prospecting and exploration of deep-sea
resources. Part VII assesses the remedies designed to both eliminate
conflict and assure environmentally responsible development of
resources. The article concludes that U.S. isolationist policy with regard
to a common resource is shortsighted and risks compromising the
integrity of the deep seabed environment.
II. TOWARD CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
It was once believed that a feature of the earth so vastly great as
the seas could easily be shared among the earth's peoples. The idea of
common ownership surfaces again and again among scholars and
legislators. Justinian, in 529 A.D., declared that "the sea is common to all,
both as to ownership and as to use. It is owned by no one; it is incapable
6. Louis B. Sohn, Managingthe Law of the Sea: AmbassadorPardo's Forgotten Second Idea,
36 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 285, 299 (1997).
7. Bernard H. Oxman, The Duty to Respect GenerallyAccepted InternationalStandards,24
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109, 120 (1991).
8.

See INT'L SEABED AUTH., DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY RELATING TO THE REGULA-

TIONS ON PROSPECTING AND EXPLORATION FOR POLYMETALLIc NODULES IN THE AREA (2000),
available at http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/OFFICIALDOCUMENTS/DOC_2000
/ISBA_6_A_18_E.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2004) [hereinafter INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS].
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9
of appropriation, just as is the air. And its use is open freely to all men."
This opinion echoed Celsus' dictum that mare communum usum omnibus
hominibus, or all men have free use of the sea.10
Opposing views were not unheard of, both before and after
Justinian and Celsus. The ancient Greeks considered the Mediterranean
their own, while Alexander the Great relied on sea power to conquer
nations great and small. The sea law of Rhodes was internationally
recognized as the first maritime legal code of conduct." Later, Gaius' res
nullius declared the seas belonging to no one and as such falling under
the ownership of the first occupant. 12 This thinking, in fact, was most
consistent with reality as Rome declared the Mediterranean its own, or
mare nostrum. 13 But Hugo Grotius, Dutch jurist and statesman, writing a
thousand years after Justinian, reiterated that "the high seas were not
4
within the sovereignty of any state."'
Thus, the legal regime applicable to the high seas was
characterized by fragmentation and fraught by mandates and "soft
law"' 5 that failed to adequately protect marine resources. By the midtwentieth century, custom was no longer sufficient to govern use of the
seas and attempts at codification began to be made. Conventions
regarding use of the seas and settlement of disputes were approved
following U.N. Conferences that gradually increased in scope and aim.
In 1967, Arvid Pardo, Ambassador of Malta to the United
Nations, revived the principle of commonality in a strikingly altruistic
fashion. He proposed that the seabed with its mineral resources be
declared as belonging to mankind in common, that limits of national
jurisdiction be frozen until the continental shelf is clearly delineated, and
that an international agency be charged with safeguarding the high
seas. 16 Pardo astutely realized that it was not sufficient to simply declare
9. The Digest of Justinian, in PERCY T. FENN, THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT OF FISHING IN
TERRITORIAL WATERS 23 (1926); DANNY M. LEIPZIGER & JAMES L. MUDGE, SEABED MINERAL
RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at xv (1976).

10. E. Jones, Law of the Sea 6, in Emerging Ocean Oil and Mining Law 5 (Seymour W.
Wurfel ed., 1974) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of New Mexico
School of Law Library).
11. GALDORISI & VIENNA, supra note 4, at 121.
12. FRANCISCO V. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE
RESOURCES OF THE SEAS: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (1963).

13.
14.
15.

Sohn, supra note 6, at 285.
Jones, supra note 10, at 6.
For a description of "soft law," see MARK W. JAN1S & JOHN E. NOYES, INTER-

NATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 588 (2d ed. 2001).

16. Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Address Before the United Nations, in Request for the
Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Twenty-Second Session. Declaration and
Treaty Concerning The Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction,and the Use of Their
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the high seas as belonging to all mankind, since the technologically
advanced states would be most likely to draw benefit from newly
accessible riches. In order to truly reserve the vast resources of the high
seas for all mankind, it was necessary to settle jurisdictional issues and
questions of access. Natural resources were to be used in accordance
with the Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, to
principally benefit poor countries.
It was not until 1974 that the Group of 77-the over 120
developing countries at the United Nations17 -would demand that an
international authority be created to enable the Group to mine the
seabed independently. 18 To satisfy these demands, the third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea established an International Seabed
Authority charged with mining the seabed "on behalf of mankind as a
whole" and with granting contracts to those who wish to mine
privately.19 The United States, dissatisfied with this arrangement,
entered into a "mini-treaty" 20 with France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, and the United Kingdom to mine the seabed. Shortly, the
agreement was expanded to include eight states, 21 a situation deemed
illegal by the Group of 77.22
Thus, the Group of 77 rejected the concept of res nullius, which
implicitly allowed ownership to the first claim on deep seabed mining,
while considerably expanding the concept of res communis as it refers to
the common heritage of mankind. Not only would the seas be common
property of all states, but the Group's mining efforts would be
specifically facilitated by an international authority. In contrast, the
"freedom of the seas" principle allowed the United States and several
other western states to assert their rights to mine the deep seabed
Resources in the Interests of Mankind. Note Verbale Dated 17 August 1967from the Permanent
Mission of Malta to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,22nd Sess., Annex,
Mem., U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967); Arvid Pardo, Who Will Control the Sea-Bed?, 47 FOREIGN
AFF. 135 (1968).
17.

HARRY F. YOUNG,

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, ATLAS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN

RELATIONS (Colleen Sussman ed., 1984). Today the group is comprised of 134 countries; for
a list of members, see GROUP SEVENTY-SEVEN AT THE UNITED NATIONS, at http://www.
g77.org/main/docs.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
18. Harry, supra note 5, at 211.
19. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, § 3, art. 153(1),
A/Res/48/263 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
20. Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of
the Deep Sea Bed, Sept. 2,1982.
21. Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Sea-Bed Mining, Aug. 3, 1984 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1984).
22. Letter Dated 29 August 1980 from the Chairman of the Group of 77, Ambassador E.
Kanyanya Wapenyi (Uganda), to the Presidentof the Conference, 3rd UN Conference on the Law
of the Sea, Resumed 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/106 at 111 (Sept. 23, 1980).
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without, of course, claiming ownership of the seabed itself. It was
abundantly clear, however, that this freedom-of-the-seas principle no
longer would accommodate states in their quest for what were obviously
finite resources.
III. THE U.S. POSITION
Necessitated by the exclusive federal interest in matters
concerning its international affairs, the United States, in 1947, brought
suit against the state of California. The Supreme Court in that case
recognized the "paramount rights in [and] power" of the United States
over its submerged lands. 23 Dispute over these lands with other coastal
states over oil and gas leasing led Congress to enact the Submerged
25
Lands Act 24 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in 1953. In more
recent cases, the position of the Supreme Court has been that "each state
yielded sovereignty over submerged lands in accepting statehood and
the Constitution." 26 By the same token, it is the function and
responsibility of Congress to introduce legislation that protects the
27
interests of U.S. companies engaging in deep seabed mining. Toward
that end, and to cooperate with countries adopting similar legislation,
2s
U.S. companies introduced bills to regulate deep-sea mining.
Senate Bill 1134, introduced to promote conservation and
orderly development of deep sea mineral resources, was intended as a
stop-gap measure until such time that an international regime would be
in place. 29 Proponents of the bill believed that enactment of such
legislation by the United States would have the effect of prompting
30
timely international negotiations regarding the seabed. Further, they
argued that the bill was "designed to be compatible" with any future
international regime by acceding to that regime and "shar[ing] the
benefits with other nations." 31 Certain provisions of the bill, such as the
establishment of an insurance program for the benefit of companies
undertaking deep sea mining, were rightfully criticized, since it is not a

23.
24.
25.

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
43 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).

26. MICHAEL S. BARAM ET AL., MARINE MINING OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: LEGAL,
TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 150 (1978).

27. Lee Metcalf, Foreword,10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 430 (1973).
28. S. 2801, H.R. 13904, 92nd Cong. (2d Sess. 1972); H.R. 9, S. 1134, 93rd Cong. (1st.
Sess. 1973).
29. Metcalf, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31.

Id. at 431.
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function of the U.S. government to subsidize private business whether
other governments engage in such practices or not.32 Legislating mining
activity, however, is a governmental duty and was indeed a necessary
condition imposed by banks that would potentially finance the mining
industry. 33 But interim bills did not sufficiently protect the rights of U.S.
mining interests, insofar as U.S. citizens engaging in deep sea mining
were required to observe "regulations designed to protect...other uses of
the sea, including prospecting and mining by persons not subject to the
jurisdictionof the United States in the very areas in which they are licensed to
mine."34
The U.S. Congress, noting that deep-sea exploration technology
would require a substantial investment, 35 and that UNCLOS III was
likely to financially obligate the United States to an international
organization, 36 adopted the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act.37
In this statute, Congress urged acceleration of the environmental study
necessary to assess exploratory and commercial recovery activities. 38 The
Act also acknowledges that deep seabed resources are a common
heritage of mankind,39 states that the United States is not asserting
jurisdiction over any areas of the deep seabed while engaging in
exploration or commercial recovery of resources, 40 and encourages the
Secretary of State to pursue negotiations for a comprehensive Law of the
41
Sea Treaty.
Refusal of the United States to be a signatory to UNCLOS III did
not imply that the United States was rejecting the customary
international law, which is now codified by the Convention. America's
policy toward UNCLOS III has largely remained as President Reagan
enunciated in his six-point statement in 1982.42 The United States did
32. Id. at 432.
33. John G. Laylin, The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining Until Superseded by International
Agreement, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 438-39 (1973).
34. Id. at 437, 3(b).
35. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401a(11) (2000).
36. Id. § 1401a(15).
37. Id. §§ 1401 et seq.
38. Id. § 1419a(1).
39. Id. § 1401b(1).
40. Id. § 1402a(1), (2).
41. Id. § 1402b(1).
42. Statement by the President, U.S. Policy and the Law of the Sea, Jan. 29, 1982, and
White House Fact Sheet Accompanying the Presidential Statement, DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar.
1982, at 54-55. The points are that, to be ratified by the United States, UNCLOS III must:
*Not deter development of any deep seabed mineral resources to meet national and
world demand;
*Assure national access to these resources by current and future qualified entities to
enhance U.S. security of supply, to avoid monopolization of the resources by the
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sign the Convention on July 29, 1994, after modifications to Part XI
dealing with issues of the deep seabed were negotiated by the U.N.
43
Secretary-General with the developed nations. In 1995, President
Clinton called on Congress to create an Oceans Commission and ratify
44
the Law of the Sea Convention. Although the United States has not yet
ratified UNCLOS III, attempts to coordinate U.S. oceans policy with the
in the various U.N. entities
Convention continue through participation
45
law.
this
of
charged with the development
After November of 2001, President Bush created a Commission
on Ocean Policy and encouraged the Senate to ratify the Convention
before 2002.46 The President's strong push to get this legislation ratified
by the Senate met a major stumbling block at the Foreign Relations
Committee. Led by Senator Lugar, the Committee convened on October
14 and October 21, 2003. At the first meeting, the Committee spoke with
non-administration members such as the American Bar Association and
various retired and current members of the Coast Guard and the Navy,
as well as with various groups such as the Bureau of Oceans and
47
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Unlike Chairman
Helms, who had withheld any decision on the legislation, Chairman
operating arm of the international authority, and to promote the economic
development of the resources;
oProvide a decision-making role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and
effectively protects the political and economic interests and financial contributions
of participating states;
oNot allow for amendments to come into force without approval of the participating
states, including, in our case, the advice and consent of the Senate;
oNot set other undesirable precedents for international organizations;
*Be likely to receive the advice and consent of the Senate. In this regard, the
convention should not contain provisions for the mandatory transfer of private
technology and participation by and funding for national liberation movements.
43. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of UNCLOS Il1, July 28, 1994,
entered into force July 28, 1996 (making substantial modifications to the provisions of Part
XI); see also Houston Putnam Lowry, So Your Client Wants to Engage in Deep Seabed Mining, 5
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 325 (1999), available at http://www.brownwelsh.com/HPLowryarchive/DeepSeaBed.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
44. President Clinton, Address at the National Oceans Conference in Monterey, Cal.
(June 12,1995).
45. Such U.N. entities include the U.N. General Assembly, the International Maritime
Organization, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Oceanic
Commission, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, and The International Seabed Authority. See GALDORISI &
VIENNA, supra note 4, at 134.
46. Am. Geological Inst., Government Affairs Program, Law of the Sea, 2-27-0, at http:
//www.agiweb.org/gap/legisl08/lawofthesea.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2004).
47. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing on T. Doc. 103-39 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Senator Lugar).
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Lugar stated that "[t]he Law of the Sea Convention has great potential to
advance U.S. interests related to the navigation of the seas, the
productive use of their resources, and the protection of the marine
environment." 48 After that promising start, the rest of the meeting went
well with each of the parties stressing the value of ratifying the
Convention. In the second meeting, administration officials, the military,
and other groups also agreed that there was little to prevent the United
States from ratifying the Convention.
Since that time, no further news has emerged. As of the drafting
of this article, President Bush's first term in office is nearing its end.
Though he has attempted to get the Convention ratified, progress
remains elusive and it is uncertain that the goal will be reached before
the election.
IV. GEOGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY OF THE DEEP SEABED
As man became more adept at navigating the oceans, the
question of boundaries needed to be satisfied. Jurisdictional areas were
established largely depending on custom and geographical, undersea
features. Dividing the waters on their surface followed custom and
generated the territorial sea adjacent to the coastal states, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the high seas. Dividing the
land under the waters was accomplished by geographical features, the
inaccessibility of which rendered the exercise academic until very
recently. Nevertheless, two zones were recognized and consisted of the
continental shelf and the deep seabed. 49 The latter is a source of various
minerals perceived to have strategic and economic importance.
A. Area of the Deep Seabed
The deep seabed is comprised of all submerged lands beyond
territorial jurisdiction of the coastal states. Its exploration and
exploitation are a very recent reality, beginning with submersibles and
progressing to today's floating experiment stations. The discovery of
"nodular polymetallic structures containing large amounts
of
manganese"50 during the H.M.S. Challenger expeditions from 1872 to
187651 hinted at the potential of this area of the seas. "Project Mohole"
48.

Id.

49. THOMAS A. CLINGAN, THE LAW OF THE SEA: OCEAN LAW AND POLICY, at 1 (1994).
50. THE ECONOMICS OF DEEP-SEA MINING 2 (Juergen B. Donges ed., 1985).
51. J. MURRAY & A.F. RENARD, REPORT ON DEEP-SEA DEPOSITS BASED ON THE
SPECIMENS COLLECTED DURING THE VOYAGE OF H.M.S. CHALLENGER IN THE YEARS 1872 TO

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

was organized to drill to the Mohorovicic Discontinuity in order to
52
obtain a sample from the earth's mantle. Deep-sea submersibles created
53
by Auguste Piccard and his son Jacques held a promise akin to that of
space exploration that would arrive generations later. Trieste II, a
submersible created by Jacques Piccard and purchased by the United
States, successfully reached the Challenger Deep of the Marianas
Trench.54 Yet, progress has been slow in both research and exploitation
of the area and much of the information acquired remains proprietary in
nature.
B. Geology of the Deep Seabed
Oceanic ridges form a continuous range that surrounds the earth
underwater and is called a Mid-Ocean Ridge though it does not always
occupy a mid-ocean place. Together with its branches, the ridge extends
36,000 miles.5 5 Valleys and volcanoes occur along the ridge, and abyssal
well as
plains lie along both sides. Trenches and smaller basins as
56
seabed.
the
of
features
main
other
the
are
volcanoes
individual
Geologically, the deep seabed is a product of the forces
attributed to continental drift. Specifically, it is the shifting and sliding of
plates on the earth's molten core that shape both the dry land and the
seabed. The process is continuous and most obvious in its manifestation
as seismic events or volcanic eruptions. When these events take place in
the deep seabed, seawater enters magma chambers and reacts with
minerals there as it is heated. The water "boils" back out through fissures
and, as it cools, the minerals are precipitated as polymetallic sulfide
57
deposits.

1876 (1891). See also JOHN L. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 147 (1965); Allen,

supra note 5, at 577.
52. Nat'l Academies: Advisers to the Nation on Sci., Eng'g, & Med., Project Mohole,
1958-1966, at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/archives/amsoc.html (last visited Aug.
28, 2004).
53.

THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001), available at http://www.bartleby.

com/65/pi/Piccard.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
54. P. Huggard, The Deep Ocean and Its Non-Living Resources: A New Legal Realm 43
(1972), in Emerging Ocean Oil and Mining Law 5 (Seymour W. Wurfel ed., 1974)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law
Library). See also JURAJ ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 28

n.36 (1970).
55. MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 192 (7th ed. 1992).
56. V.E. MCKELVEY & FRANK F.H. WANG, U.S. DEP'T INT., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
WORLD SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES (1969).
57. FILLMORE C.F. EARNEY, MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES 85-86 (1990); Allen, supra

note 5, at 569.
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C. Manganese Nodules
In addition to unconsolidated deposits, polymetallic manganese
nodules have been found in many areas of the deep sea. Manganese
nodules were first found in 1803,5 but it was not until after the Second
World War that the world's oceans began to be explored systematically.
This was the last frontier on the planet and scientists to this day are
continuing to make new discoveries. Manganese nodules have been
considered a potential source for various ores since the 1960s.5 9 Their
value depends on their constituents, but the richest nodules have been
found in the Pacific Ocean at depths of 12,000 to 18,000 feet. 60 As their
name suggests, manganese is the principal constituent of polymetallic
manganese nodules. The metal is used in the production of steel. 61 The
nodules' other constituents are iron, silicon, nickel, copper, and cobalt. 62
The thin oceanic crust is made up mostly of basaltic bedrock and
the nodules are scattered on its surface and also found in the substrate in
some areas. 63 Other metals, such as zinc, mercury, chromite, and
platinum are also expected to occur in the basaltic rock that originates
from the earth's mantle. 64 The polymetallic sulfide deposits have been
found to contain iron, copper, and zinc sulfides, and, in some cases, gold
and silver. 65 The nodules alone are an unexpectedly rich resource,
containing, by one estimate, 400 billion tons of manganese, 16.4 billion
tons of nickel, 8.8 billion tons of copper, and 918 billion tons of cobalt. 66
They are believed to be "the largest mineral deposit on this planet." 67
Nevertheless, and despite their ubiquity -they have been found at the
58. Mining in Manitoba, Deep Sea Bed Nodules, at http://www.digistar.mb.ca/minsci/
future/nodules.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
59. Id.
60. Louis Henkin, Law of the Sea's Mineral Resources 3 n.7 (1968), in Emerging Ocean Oil
and Mining Law 42 (Seymour W. Wurfel ed., 1974) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the University of New Mexico School of Law Library). See also F. LaQue, Deep Ocean
Mining: Prospects and Anticipated Short Term Benefits, in PACEM IN MARIBUS 133 (Elisabeth
Mann Borgese ed., 1972).
61. David B. Brooks, Low Grade and Nonconventional Sources of Manganese 8 (1966),
in Emerging Ocean Oil and Mining Law 5 (Seymour W. Wurfel ed., 1974) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
62. LaQue, supra note 60, at 136; THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
USES OF THE SEA 19 (1968), in Emerging Ocean Oil and Mining Law 43 (Seymour W. Wurfel
ed., 1974) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of New Mexico School of
Law Library).
63. MCKELVEY & WANG, supra note 56.
64. Id.
65. Allen, supra note 5, at 569.
66.
67.

CLINGAN, supranote 49, at 266.
BRUCE C. HEEZEN & CHARLES D. HOLLISTER, THE FACE OF THE DEEP 423 (1971).
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68
bottom of all the oceans and even the Great Lakes - theories of their
formation are tentative.
The nodules appear to be most numerous in undisturbed areas,
possibility that mining activities will negatively impact this
the
raising
resource. It has been hypothesized that they form through accretion of
ions in layers, much like the layers of an onion, but at a very slow rate of
69
between 1 mm per 1000 years to 1 mm per 100,000 years. It must be
noted that theories advanced regarding the age of polymetallic nodules
continue to be debated. The finding of nodules in the North Pacific on
deposits above Miocene-Oligocene strata and in Paleogene sediments
above Late Cretaceous strata, as well as within the strata themselves,
70
the
suggests the fossil origin of the nodules. Isotopic dating places
71
It is
speed of nodule formation at around one to ten mm/million years.
unclear whether nuclei, such as small rocks or shark's teeth, attract the
mineral particles that eventually form the nodules, or whether sediments
contribute to the mineral deposition, or even whether microorganisms
assist in nodule formation.72
For all that we have learned about these nodules, crucial details
are still missing about their formation. In addition to material that may
precipitate from ocean water, especially from hydrothermal solutions
present near volcanoes, diagenetic remobilization of manganese in the
sediments, and concentration by submarine weathering of basalt are
73
processes implicated in nodule formation. Attempts to study the
nodules can be grouped into three areas: the source of ore matter and
manganese balance, the genetic classification of manganese nodules, and
74
the biogenic aspects in manganese nodule genesis. Scientists have
found scant support for the idea that the source of ore matter is

68. ROSs D. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES: ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
OF THE SEA 217 (1979).
69. MERO, supra note 51, at 154, 175-77 (1965).

70.

K.O. Emery & Brian J. Skinner, Mineral Deposits of the Deep-Ocean Floor, 1 MARINE

MINING 33 (1977).
71. Id.

72. Werner Raab, Physical and Chemical Features of Pacific Deep Sea Manganese Nodules
and Their Implications to the Genesis of Nodules, in PAPERS FROM A CONFERENCE ON
FERROMANGANESE DEPOSITS ON THE OCEAN FLOOR 31-49 (David R. Horn ed., 1972); Henry
L. Ehrlich, The Role of Microbes in Manganese Nodule Genesis, in PAPERS FROM A CONFERENCE
ON FERROMANGANESE DEPOSITS ON THE OCEAN FLOOR 63-69 (David R. Horn ed., 1972).

73.

E. Bonatti et al., Classification and Genesis of Submarine Iron-ManganeseDeposits, in

PAPERS FROM A CONFERENCE ON FERROMANGANESE DEPOSITS ON THE OCEAN FLOOR 149-66

(David R. Horn ed., 1972). See also S.E. Calvert & N.B. Price, Geochemical Variation in
FerromanganeseNodules and Associated Sediments from the Pacific Ocean, 5 MARINE CHEMISTRY
43,43-74 (1968).
74. Id.
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exclusively volcanic, terrigenous, or hydrothermal. Goldshmidt in 1954
and Elderfield in 1976 presented evidence that levels of manganese and
other metals in the nodules exceed the supply from the above-named
sources. 75 As early as 1928, Butkevich gave evidence that a third factor,
biogenic activity, lent itself to the formation of manganese nodules. 76
Discovery of bacteria in the nodules suggested that microorganisms such
as iron bacteria have some part in the accretion of iron (Fe), manganese
(Mn), and other metals in the nodules. 7 It may well be debated that,
rather than being responsible for nodule formation, the bacteria are
simply attracted to the iron deposits already present in the nodules. The
nodules are classified according to ore content. They are considered to be
hydrogenous if they contain large amounts of base metals and a variable
Mn/Fe ratio; hydrothermal if they are high in iron and low in other
metals, with again a variable Mn/Fe ratio; and diagenetic if they are high
in Mn/Fe but low in base metals. 78
D. Mining of Manganese Nodules
Exploration of the deep seabed for manganese nodules involves
prospecting activity over a large area before potentially rich sources can
be pinpointed. The surveying and mapping of the seabed with optical,
acoustic, magnetic, and satellite systems is a complicated and expensive
proposition. The actual sampling prior to mining presents more logistical
problems. Samples are taken widely apart by free-fall samplers, gravity
or piston corers, or by dredging. 79 Capabilities vary among these
samplers, the free-fall ones being best suited for obtaining nodules from
a square-foot area. Corers provide sediment information under the
nodules, while dredging is feasible only in areas with rich nodule
80
concentrations.
Once a site is selected for mining, collection by mechanical, air,
or hydraulic system follows. These are kept simple to minimize
maintenance. 81 Lifting the nodules is accomplished with dredge buckets
and miles of rope in the mechanical case, or with a hydraulic pump that
lifts water and nodules together, or with an airlift that operates by
75.
76.
77.
78.

Mining in Manitoba, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.

79.

ELISABETH M. BORGESE, THE MINES OF NEPTUNE: MINERALS AND METALS FROM THE

SEA 70-71, 79 (1985).
80. Economic Implications of Sea-Bed Mineral Development in the InternationalArea, Report
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/25 (1974).
81. Id.
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82
suction like a vacuum that collects nodules from the ocean floor. The
simplest and least expensive of these, the bucket system, collected seven
83
tons of nodules near Hawaii in August and September of 1972. It is
important, however, to attempt to suit the method to the particular site
selected, since narrow trenches or an uneven floor may disable some of
84
the systems or render them inefficient. The task is further complicated
by the light weight of the nodules themselves. It is expected that some
will be entirely missed by the collection apparatus, while others will float
85
away, being only twice as heavy as water. The proprietary nature of the
undertaking suggests that little information is available on the results,
but it is reasonable to assume that the applicable techniques will have to
vary according to nodule composition and will be refined in the future.
The attraction of a stable, rich supply of copper, nickel, and, to a
lesser extent because of its erratic distribution, cobalt would encourage
deep sea mining activity by the United States were it not for political
86
control of this area by the United Nations. Nevertheless, the United
87
off
States can exercise undisputed sovereignty over the Blake Plateau
there.
expected
be
the coast of Florida and, therefore, mining activity can
Weighing the efficiency of various mining methods, speakers at the
Ocean Mining Symposium II held in Houston, Texas, on February 20-21,
1973, predicted that, despite difficulties encountered in deep seabed
will
mining, "[i]ncreasing inland mining costs and international politics
s8
make offshore mining ventures more attractive in the near future."
The United States has since resolved conflicting interests with
other states and issued licenses for exploration of the deep seabed to four
private consortia. 89 Commentators believe that continuing jurisdictional
questions pertaining to the deep seabed, as well as discovery of the
polymetallic nodules within the EEZ of the United States, render U.S.
9°
objections to Part XI of UNCLOS III "academic." The American Bar
Association, noting that Part XI no longer presents an obstacle, urged
support of UNCLOS III in view of the significance of the Convention to

82.
83.

ECKERT, supra note 68, at 220.
CLINGAN, supra note 49, at 268.

84.

ECKERT, supranote 68, at 224.

85.
86.
87.

Id.
Emery & Skinner, supra note 70, at 34.

Id.

88. DAVID M. FRAZIER & OLE P. ERICKSON, OCEAN MINING SYMPOSIUM OSM II, CUrER
SUCTION DREDGES IN MINING OPERATIONS, WORLD DREDGING CONFERENCE 38 (1973).
89. JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982
TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES 192 (1992).

90.

Id.
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international interests. 91 Economic impediments persist, however, since
"before investing, banks normally require borrowers to obtain exclusive
92
rights to an ore body."
Economic questions complicate a fair assessment of U.N. policy
as well. Critics of U.N.'s advocacy for the developing nations point out
that those states "may assert many rights, but...are burdened with very
few reciprocal obligations." 93 Others argue that the rivers of some inland
countries such as Congo (Kinshasa) contribute to the accumulation of the
rich sediments found in the deep sea.94 For its part, in support of deep
seabed mining, the U.N. Secretariat stated that exploitation of deep
seabed mineral resources might stabilize raw material markets by
diversifying the sources of supply. 95 International measures to avoid
flooding the world markets with seabed minerals would protect
developing countries from suffering economic harm.96
V. SOVEREIGNTY ISSUES
Although the feared "wholesale partition" 97 of the deep seabed
by the coastal states did not come to pass, expecting the "invisible hand"
of technology and political development 98 to solve the quandary appears
utopian and promises a chaotic confrontation among the various
interests in this final frontier. Since freedom of the high seas implies
absence of any territorial jurisdiction, recognition of the authority of a
flag nation was the only viable alternative for jurisdiction in the high
seas. 99 A flag nation system, however, is perceived as an obstacle to the
achievement of an international regime that would reduce the potential
for conflict and impose mandatory dispute settlement. 00 The risk of
creeping jurisdiction, of granting limited sovereignty over seabed

91. Id. at 427 n.25.
92. Richard A. Frank, lumping Ship, 43 FOREIGN POL'Y 134 (1981).
93. Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional UnderstandingRegarding Deep Seabed Matters: An
Ill-conceived Regime for U.S. Deep Seabed Mining, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 223, 236 (1986).
94. ANDRASSY, supra note 54, at 172-73.
95. Possible Methods and Criteriafor the Sharing by the InternationalCommunity of Proceeds
and Other Benefits Derived from the Exploitation of the Resources of the Area Beyond National
Jurisdiction. PreliminaryNote by the Secretariat,G.A. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. No.
A/AC. 138/24 (1970).
96. Id.
97. ANDRASSY, supra note 54, at 167.
98. H. Gary Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act -A Negative View, 10
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 446, 449 (1973).
99. Id. at 453 n.24.
100. Id. at 456.
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resources only to have it expand into full territorial sovereignty, would
be ever present without an international regime governing the deep
seabed. 101
A. The Outer Space Regime
Following UNCLOS III, a doctrine of non-appropriation appears
to be universally endorsed regarding the deep seabed, even by countries
that have not ratified the Convention. Commentators point out that
provisions of the Draft Convention - as well as the final document - bear
similarities to the outer space treaty and the Antarctic treaty in that
national interests are subordinated to international ones under a doctrine
of non-appropriation. 10 2 Outer space law began to take shape in earnest
after the launch of Sputnik in 1957.103 A Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space' °4 in 1963 was followed in 1967 by the Treaty of Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
05
Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Article 2 of that
treaty provides that space and celestial bodies are "not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means." Similarly, the Antarctic Treaty of
1959 provides that no state may acquire an interest in Antarctic territory
10 6
by conducting research therein.
The differences between the relatively recent and limited nature
of outer space law and the customary, comprehensive nature of the law
07
of the sea have also been pointed out. Unlike outer space law, the law
08
of the sea governs many existing uses and concerns many nations.
Nevertheless, many provisions included in UNCLOS III were modeled
0
on the outer space treaty' 0 9 so as to accord "a legitimate paternity"" to
the 1967 treaty.

101. Ann L. Hollick, United States Ocean Politics, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467, 475 (1973);
Knight, supra note 98, at 456.
102. H. Gary Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the International Seabed
Area: Background, Description, and Some PreliminaryThoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459, 493
(1971).
103. Picker, supra note 2, at 76.
104. G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5656
(1963).
105. 18 U.S.T.2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (Jan. 27,1967).
106. 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S.71 (1961).
107.

Louis HENKIN, LAW FOR THE SEA'S MINERAL RESOURCES n.23 (1967).

108.
109.

Id.
MORELL, supra note 89, at 151.
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B. Res Communis and the Free-Rider Problem
Under the present res communis principle in operation, the high
seas are common property and as such may be explored and exploited
by all states. The large investment costs in ships and machinery and the
high expenses involved in mining these areas, coupled with the lack of
applicable property rights have the effect of discouraging potential deep
sea miners. It has been conjectured that recognition of property rights
would encourage mining by eliminating the free-rider problem. The freerider argument posits that, once mining activity in an area is undertaken
by an entity, others may encroach on the same deposit site since only the
nodules actually recovered from the ocean floor become private
property.'
C. Res Communis Applied: Economic/Technological Solutions
Concerns of countries that rely on income derived from the
production of metals such as manganese, copper, cobalt, and nickel also
have the effect of delaying and influencing regulation pertaining to
deep-sea mining. Many of the producers are developing countries, while
consumers are the industrialized countries. Should deep-sea mining of
metals increase the supply, thereby reducing prices, producer countries
112
would experience a drop in their income that they can ill-afford.
Economic solutions have been proposed, such as a system of
international taxation that could be implemented to guarantee an
113
equitable distribution of the proceeds from deep seabed mining.
Whether this takes the form of a profits tax or a royalty, and the effects of
each on mineral production and redistribution of profits have been
debated without necessarily considering that these schemes encourage
dependency of the developing nations rather than promoting efficient
recovery of resources.
Based on the res communis principle, exploitation of deep-sea
resources obligates developed nations to a transfer of technology as well
as a revenue sharing scheme. Although some commentators oppose the
transfer of deep seabed mining technology to developing nations,
claiming that such transfer is patently unfair to private interests, 114 others

110. Aldo Armando Cocca, The Advances of International Law Through the Law of Outer
Space, 9 J. SPACE L. 13, 20 (1981).
111. ECKERT, supra note 68, at 241.
112.

LEIPZIGER & MUDGE, supra note 9, at 131.

113.
114.

Id. at 191.
Doug Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475, 483 (1982).
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point out that states have the power to appropriate property with just
compensation or to revoke patents if necessary.11 5 In addition, deep
seabed mining technology that enjoys patent protection in the United
States can be pirated outside U.S. jurisdiction, where U.S. patent laws are
largely unenforceable.1 1 6 Similarly debated revenue sharing provisions
found eventual acceptance under the principle of a common heritage of
117
mankind.
D. Res Communis Revised
Protecting the world's seas against abuses of rights that may
threaten to exhaust resources called for international regulation, either
"customary or contractual."" 8 Since freedom of the seas assumed
inexhaustibility of resources, a condition that proved unfounded in the
case of polymetallic nodules," 9 a revised understanding of res communis
as a peremptory norm is in order. The concept of jus cogens' 20 accepts no
derogation or inconsistency. 121 Although the freedom of the seas
122
principle has historically been recognized as a peremptory norm,
derogation from that norm in order to stem destruction of resources is
not a violation of the principle when states agree among themselves to
limit their use: "[T]here would seem to be no reason why two States shall
not agree that, as between themselves, the width of territorial waters
should be fifty miles."' 23
The provisions of UNCLOS III regarding the interests of
developing countries to a large extent codify customary international
law, since "as early as 1950 the U.N. International Law Commission had
endorsed exploitation of submarine resources 'for the benefit of all
mankind."' 24 Further, the classical doctrine of natural law that

115. MORELL, supra note 89, at 99.
116. Id.; see also Dieter Stauder, Patent Protectionin ExtraterritorialAreas (Continental Shelf
High Seas, Air Space, and Outer Space), 7 IIC INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 470,
470-79 (1976).
117. MORELL, supra note 89, at 104.
118. Id. at 175.
119. Id. at 392-93 n.315.
120. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,1969, art. 53,1155 U.N.T.S. 311.
121. MORELL, supra note 89, at 183.
122. CHRIsTOS L. ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 15
(1976); CHRISTOS L. ROZAKIS, LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, THE GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE OVER
THE AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF, OCCASIONAL PAPER No.28 (1975).

123. James Lesley Brierly, First Report on the Law of Treaties, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 154, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
124. [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 384, 1 193, 198, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/
Add.1.
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recognized both the validity of international treaties and the common as opposed to private -rights in force when using a res communis existed
for centuries.125 The "yielding nature" of jus dispositivum in international
relations is superseded by jus cogens, which becomes effective once its
norms are codified in a treaty. 26 Most importantly, codification should
not blind interested parties, whether developing or developed nations, to
the limits that need to be placed on exploitation of deep seabed
resources.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY
Creation of an International Seabed Authority (ISA), proposed
by the Group of 77, is now a reality. The ISA "is an autonomous
international agency having a relationship agreement with the United
Nations." 127 Established under UNCLOS III, "as modified by the 1994
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part IX [sic] (seabed
provisions) of the Convention," 128 the ISA was implemented through a
now-defunct Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM). PREPCOM became
operational upon the signing of UNCLOS III by the fiftieth state and
when the Final Act was adopted on December 9, 1982.129 PREPCOM
meetings were open for observation (rather than voting) to states that
did not sign the Convention but did sign the Final Act. Although at the
time the United States had signed the Final Act, it did not attend
PREPCOM meetings and, beginning in 1983, the U.S. government
refused to fund PREPCOM's work.130
Today, the Authority has 143 members 131 and its organization
includes an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat, an Enterprise, an
Economic Planning Commission, and a Legal and Technical
Commission. 132 The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
functions autonomously and may elect members to a Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber. 33 The task of the Authority "is to organize and control all
mineral-related activities in the international seabed area beyond the
125. MORELL, supra note 89, at 184-85.
126. Alfred Verdoss, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, 60 AM. J. INT'L
L. 55 (1966).
127. Press Release, Int'l Seabed Auth., Seabed Authority to Resume Study of
Hydrothermal Sulphides and Cobalt Crusts at Ninth Session, 28 July-8 Aug. (July 23, 2003).
128. Id.
129. EARNEY, supra note 57, at 29.
130. Id.
131. Press Release, supra note 127. For a list of current members, see www.isa.org.jm
(last visited Aug. 24. 2004).
132. EARNEY, supra note 57, at 25.
133. Id.
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jurisdiction of any State, an area underlying most of the world's
oceans." 134 Although coastal states can claim and exploit areas of the
continental shelf more than 200 nautical miles from shore, under
UNCLOS, states are required to make payments to the international
135
community through the ISA.
The 2003-2004 budget of the Authority is $10,509,700, while
assessments of member states were reduced by $2.6 million through both
savings and a payment in the sum of $1,074,000 by the United States in
September 2002, to "[cover] its arrears for the period up to November
1998 during which it was a provisional member." 136 States that fall more
than two years behind in their payments risk losing their vote.
A. Regulations on Polymetallic Nodules
On its seventy-sixth meeting, held in Kingston, Jamaica, on July
3-14, 2000, the ISA considered and approved the Regulations on
Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area. 137 The
Regulations state that prospecting, exploration, and exploitation must be
conducted in accordance with the Convention, for the benefit of
mankind as a whole, and in such a way as to avoid serious harm to the
marine environment. 138 A coup for the ISA, the Regulations resulted
from a very productive session and represent the initial segment of "a
mining code that will eventually govern exploration for and exploitation
139
of all deep seabed minerals."
1. Prospecting
In addition to protection and preservation of the marine
environment, the Regulations specify that prospectors must cooperate in
training programs and transfer of technology stipulated in articles 143
and 144 of the Convention. 14° The Secretary-General reserves the
134. Press Release, supra note 127.
135. Id. The outer boundaries of the coastal states may be extended further, but, to do
so, a submission must be made to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS). That body then studies the issue and gives advice to the coastal states.
136. Id.
137.

INT'L SEABED AUTH.,

ASSEMBLY OF THE INTERNATIONAL

SEABED AUTHORITY,

(Resumed 6th Sess., 2000), available at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/SeabedRegs.pdf
(last visited Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY].
138. INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS, supra note 8, pmbl., regs. 1, 2.
139. Press Release, Int'l Seabed Auth., Nodule Regulations Adopted by Seabed
Authority at Second Part of Sixth Session, Kingston, 3-13 July (uly 17, 2000), available at
http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/PRESS/PRESS_2000/Sixth-second/sb_6_29.pdf
(last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
140.

INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS, supra note 8, reg. 3.
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authority to deny a prospecting application should it involve an area
deemed likely to result in serious harm to the marine environment. 141
Prospecting does not confer exclusive rights and is merely a search for
deposits that may include estimation of their composition and value. 142
The ISA requires reports on the progress of prospecting within 90 days
of the end of each calendar year 43 and assures confidentiality of data
contained in such reports.44 The prospector bears the burden of
notifying the Secretary-General in writing should prospecting result in
serious harm to the marine environment or should any archaeological or
historical objects be found in the course of prospecting activity. 145
2. Exploration
Exploration confers exclusive rights and involves the search,
analysis, tests of equipment, estimation of commercial viability, and
other activities necessary in identifying potential mining sites.' 46 States or
other entities proposing to explore for polymetallic nodules must have
the financial and technical capabilities to undertake the work.147 To
qualify, such a state or entity must have spent "an amount equivalent to
at least U.S. $30 million in research and exploration activities" and no
less than ten per cent of that amount in the specific area to be explored. 14
Registered pioneer investors are exempt from this requirement.
Applications for exploration must contain sufficient data and
information regarding the specific area to allow the Council to reserve
the area based on its estimated commercial value. 149 The Council also
requires oceanographic and environmental baseline studies of the
proposed area in order to assess the environmental impact of
exploration.150
To process applications, ISA Regulations stipulate a fee of U.S.
$250,000, part of which may be refunded should the actual costs be
less.' 5' Once an application is approved, the ISA prevents other entities
from exploring for polymetallic nodules in the same area or from
performing other work that interferes with the entity granted the
141.
142.

Id. reg. 4.
Press Release, supra note 127.

143.

INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS, supra note 8, reg. 5.

144.
145.
146.

Id. reg. 6.
Id. regs. 7, 8.
Press Release, supra note 127.

147.

INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS, supra note 8, reg. 12.

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. reg. 16.
Id. reg. 18.
Id. reg. 19.
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exploration contract.15 2 No area under contract can be larger than 150,000
square kilometers 153 and contracts are issued for 15 years, with five-year
extensions possible.' 4 The contractor is expected to train ISA personnel
in exploration methods.155 Should the required state sponsorship of the
contractor change or terminate, the Secretary-General must be notified in
156
writing.
3. Contractors'Environmental Responsibilities
For any damage to the marine environment occurring during
exploration, the contractor continues to remain responsible and liable
after completion of the work. 5 7 To effectively protect the marine
environment, the precautionary approach set forth in principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration 158 will be applied and the Legal and Technical
Commission is charged with making recommendations to the Council in
this regard. 59
It is expected that contractors will use the best technology
available in order to "prevent, reduce and control pollution and other
hazards to the marine environment." 16° Annual reports of the effects of
exploration on the marine environment must be submitted by
contractors to the Secretary-General and cooperation with the Authority
is expected.' 61 To assess these effects, contractors are required to set aside
areas used as impact reference zones once exploitation begins. 162 The
power to take immediate, temporary measures-not exceeding 90
days-"to prevent, contain, and minimize serious harm to the marine
environment" is vested in the Secretary-General, should a situation arise
that requires such measures. 163 Emergency orders may then be issued to
adjust or halt work in progress. 164 If compliance is not immediate, the
Council will act to forestall damage, and, to assure the Council this

152. Id. reg. 24.
153. Id. reg. 25.
154. Id. reg. 26.
155. Id. reg. 27.
156. Id. reg. 29.
157. Id. reg. 30.
158. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
de Janeiro, June 3-14,1992, G.A. Res. 47/190, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 141,
U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
159. INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS, supra note 8, reg. 31, § 2.
160. Id. reg. 31, § 3.
161. Id. reg. 31, §§ 5, 6.
162. Id. reg. 31, § 7.
163. Id. reg. 32, §§ 1, 2.
164. Id. reg. 32, § 5.
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ability to intervene, a guarantee of the contractors' or sponsoring state's
financial and technical capability is required. 165
4. Confidentiality
Data and information submitted by the contractor remain
confidential for an initial term of ten years and subsequent terms of five
years, as long as the Secretary-General and the contractor determine the
existence of an economic risk to the contractor. 166 Although a contractor
may waive confidentiality of data and information, 167 the SecretaryGeneral and staff of the ISA, under penalty of appropriate action, are
forbidden from disclosing any data or information received during their
employment with ISA, even after such employment has ceased. 168
Technical or administrative recommendations for the guidance of
contractors may be issued by the Legal and Technical Commission, but
such recommendations will be modified or withdrawn if not consistent
169
with the Regulations.
The Convention, and specifically Part XI, Section 5, governs
disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the
Regulations. 70 The Convention also governs resources other than
polymetallic nodules found in the course of prospecting activity. 171 The
ISA and the contractor may at any time agree to revise the contract in
force should it become inequitable or should its objectives prove
"impracticable or impossible to achieve." 172
B. Application of the Regulations
Despite ISA's detailed planning, the monitoring of environmental conditions did not always proceed as expected. The seven
contractors approved to explore the seabed for polymetallic nodules
between 1987 and 2001 had registered claims for two seabed areas of
equal value intending to reserve one for the Authority. Exploration
would take place in an area up to 150,000 square kilometers, with the
contractor later relinquishing 75,000 square kilometers to the Authority.
According to the Authority, "these relinquishments have now been

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. reg. 32, § 7.
Id. reg. 35, § 3.
Id. reg. 35, § 5.
Id. reg. 36, §§ 4, 5.
Id. reg. 38, §§ 1, 2.
Id. reg. 39, § 1.
Id. reg. 40.
ASSEMBLY, supra note 137, Annex 4, § 24.
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accomplished." 173 The Regulations did not require that contractors
provide information to ISA regarding their findings on relinquished
areas, largely defeating the purpose of this arrangement. This gap in
ISA's planning indicates the pitfalls encountered in attempting to draft
regulations on an international scale. Therefore, ISA's recommendations
can best be described as a work in progress, as indeed they have been in
the latest meeting of the Authority. 174
C. Assessing Effectiveness of the Regulations
The law to protect the deep seabed obviously exists. As the
Secretary-General of the ISA indicated,175 there is no shortage of
international laws for preserving both the resources and biodiversity of
the deep seabed. 76 To deny that fact' 77 is to deny international efforts at
regulation spanning 50-plus years. As with all lawmaking efforts, the
product generated is perhaps imperfect, but it represents a great stride
toward the equitable sharing of resources among nations and, more
importantly, toward the preservation of the marine environment. Selfreporting in case of harm caused to the marine environment may well be
claimed as insufficient protection, and enforcement of environmental
responsibility may need to be more strictly delineated. Holding
contractors responsible indefinitely for damages, as the Regulations do,
is a step in the right direction. In addition, requiring contractors to set
aside equivalent areas in order to assess the effects of exploitation
ensures that a controlled scientific study takes place.
The choice of some nations, including the United States, to
position themselves outside the legal framework developed by the
United Nations through UNCLOS III and by ISA through the
173. Press Release, Int'l Seabed Auth., Seabed Authority Workshop Maps Project to
Model Polymetallic Nodule Deposits in North Pacific (May 20, 2003), available at http://
www.isa.org.jm/en/seabedarea/03_PressRel.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter
SA Project]; see discussion infra Part VI.E.
174. Press Release, Int'l Seabed Auth., Legal & Tech. Comm'n, Seabed Commission
Discusses Details of Scheme to Regulate Deep-Sea Mineral Crusts and Sulphides (July 29,
2003), availableat http://www.isa.org.jm/en/ documents/PRESS/PRESS_2003/SB-9_2.pdf
(last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
175. Secretary-General of the Int'l Seabed Auth., Statement to the Fourth Meeting of the
Informal Consultative Process (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.isa.org.jm/en/
whatsnew/UNICPOLOSStatement.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Statement].
176. E.g., INT'L SEABED REGULATIONS, supra note 8; UNCLOS III, supra note 19; Rio
Declaration, supra note 158; Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818.
177. Notwithstanding the dual atrocities of piracy and terrorism in the high seas; see
William Langewiesche, Anarchy at Sea, 292 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 50.
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Regulations can only be described as shortsighted. The United Nations,
for its part, should do better than offer a Hobson's choice to potential
members regarding ratification of UNCLOS III. The "as is" rule1 78 should
give way to reasonable modification of the law to provide incentives to
join for the nations that today remain outside the UNCLOS umbrella.
The ISA needs to recognize that, just as the model for polymetallic
nodule deposits in the North Pacific should "allow for continuing
refinement," 179 so should the Regulations admit amendments to become
a truly useful tool in protecting the marine environment. Perhaps the
true measure of the success of the Regulations will become evident fifty
or a hundred years hence-mere nanoseconds in geologic termsthrough the realization that many potential disasters to the deep-sea
ecosystem were avoided.
D. Planned Modifications/Securing Compliance
On May 14, 2003, the Legal and Technical Commission reported
that the two-week meeting during the Ninth Session of the ISA would
include consideration of a progressive fee system rather than a
relinquishment system. The grid and parallel systems for licensing and
resources would be evaluated and the Secretariat would take into
80
account the "relevant national legislation both on land and offshore."
The Commission would also "examine the second round of reports from
seven government-sponsored entities holding contracts with the
Authority that entitle them to explore for polymetallic nodules in
specified ocean tracts."' 8 ' The reports are required under the terms of the
contractors' 15-year contracts signed with the Authority in 2001 and
18 2
"[cover] the contractors' activities during the previous year."

178. When the third Conference on the Law of the Sea began in 1974 in Caracas,
Venezuela, its intention was to avoid the fragmentation of principles that characterized the
first Conference of 1958. Accordingly, consensus was to be reached on matters under
consideration and votes would be taken only as a last resort. In addition, the document had
to be accepted by a state in its entirety without rejecting specific resolutions. The expected
effect was that participating states would find it in their interest to adopt a treaty if the
majority of substantive matters proposed were acceptable, even though a number of
disfavored issues were included. See CLINGAN, supra note 49, at 3.
179. SA Project, supra note 173.
180. INT'L SEABED AUTH., INFORMATION FROM RELEVANT NATIONAL LEGISLATION
RELATING TO ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DRAFT REGULATIONS ON PROSPECTING AND
EXPLORATION FOR POLYMETALLIC SULPHIDES AND COBALT-RICH CRUSTS IN THE AREA (May

14, 2003).
181. Press Release, supra note 127.
182. Id.
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Although annual reports contain information related to
exploration, environmental study, mining tests, and training, as well as a
financial statement, not all contractors submitted reports with the
required documentation for 2001. A number of 2002 reports due at the
3
end of March 2003 were still not received as of May 2003.18 This may or
may not indicate reluctance on the part of contractors to divulge
confidential information on research and finances. For its part, the ISA
on July 29, 2003, issued a press release indicating that contractor reports
as well as reports on the Authority's scientific and technical work were
examined in closed meetings,18 4 which should allay fears that
confidential information will be made public.
The Authority is mindful that the Regulations must ensure that
the sharing of resources take place in a way that avoids limiting
185
commercial incentives or intellectual property rights. In addition, since
it is difficult to distinguish between scientific research and commercial
exploration, "a system of effective monitoring and enforcement" needs
to be put in place to regulate what is known as bioprospecting, or
"scientific research on the genetic resources of the Area." 18 6 Although
researchers currently abide by a voluntary code of conduct to protect the
environment during research and exploration, formalization of that code
187
is the next step for the ISA.
E. Scientific Benefits of Regulating Use of the Deep Seabed
The ISA can be credited for collecting and centralizing scientific
data regarding the deep seabed. The Legal and Technical Commission of
the ISA, on April 29, 2003, issued a report on the status of ISA's Central
Data Repository (CDR) on marine mineral resources.1 88 These contain
geochemical and location data sets, as well as cruise data and a reference
data set that includes the literature sources used to construct the CDR
database. In addition, a survey of international patents relating to nodule
mining technology identified 352 patents, the majority of which were

183.

INTL SEABED AUTH., LEGAL & TECH. COMM'N, STATUS OF ANNUAL REPORTS

RECEIVED FROM CONTRACTORS (2003), available at http://www.isa.org.jm/en/documents/
9thSession/LTC/isba9LTC4.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
184. Press Release, supranote 174.
185. Press Release, supra note 127.
186. Statement, supra note 175.
187. Id.
188. The data sets are available at INT'L SEABED AUTH., CENTRAL DATA REPOSITORY, at
www.cdr.isa.org.jm (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
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issued by the United States, Japan, and the former U.S.S.R. 189 If patent
issuance is any indication, the research activity that began in the 1960s
reached a peak with 34 patents in 1983 and has tapered off since.1 90
The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), located in the north-central
Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and the North American coast, has been
identified as having the richest supply of polymetallic nodules.1 91 The
most recent technical workshop of the ISA, held in Nadi, Fiji, in May
2003, proposed a scheme to develop a geological model for CCZ. The
work will entail the collaboration of scientific institutions, "with ISA
encouragement and support," and will result in a geological model that
utilizes maps and information from existing research.1 92 Standardization
of data "to increase confidence in the model" was proposed1 93 and, if
achieved, it will no doubt improve the usefulness of the model. In 2003,
the Secretariat intended to begin a compilation of "a digital atlas of the
international seabed area showing boundaries, geological features,
seafloor topography and the location of all known mineral deposits." 194
Research is underway to protect biodiversity in the CCZ. Known
as the Kaplan Project, this is a "five-year, privately funded cooperative
venture by research institutions in several nations" in which ISA also
participates. 195 The first of three research cruises under the Project took
place in February and March of 2003. Two more are planned for 2004.196
Since 1998, workshops and seminars sponsored by the ISA on
deep seabed mining continue to draw experts and scientific researchers
from various nations including the United States. Two of the objectives
of these workshops are to assess the environmental impact of activities
on the deep seabed and to foster international collaboration in protecting
the deep seabed environment and its resources, both animal and
mineral.
Sadly, attendance in recent years at ISA meetings has declined,
making it difficult to obtain the quorum required under the Convention,
which is one-half the members of the Authority.1 97 Measures were taken
189. INTL SEABED AuTH., STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AuTHORITY'S CENTRAL
DATA REPOSITORY ON MARINE MINERAL RESOURCES (2003).

190. Id.
191. Press Release, supra note 127.
192. Id.
193. SA Project, Statement of Jiancai Jing, supra note 173.
194. Press Release, supra note 127.
195. SA Project, supra note 173.
196. Id.
197. Satya N. Nandan, Secretary-General, Int'l Seabed Auth., Statement to the
Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (June 10,
2003), available at http://www.isa.org.jm/en/whatsnew/States%20Partiesl.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 18, 2004).
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to improve planning of the Ninth Session, taking place in the summer of
2003, in order to increase attendance.
VII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Although no disputes regarding the deep seabed have reached
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), several fisheries cases have been
decided and may be helpful in determining ownership issues. At the
very least, the fisheries cases serve to clarify the probable ITLOS
direction in future deep seabed mining disputes.
Whether it is a question of treaty interpretation, or a threat to
international order, or simply resource exploitation by one state
perceived as excessive by another, there has been no shortage of disputes
pertaining to the use of the seas and especially to fishery jurisdiction.1 98
In fact, it was the abundance of such disputes that led to the attempts to
formulate an international regime for the sea, however imperfect. Part of
the imperfection stems from the fact that states can neither be made to
accede to a treaty nor to submit to the judgment of an international
tribunal, unless they have previously accepted the tribunal's jurisdiction
or adopted a compromis to submit disputes to the tribunal. 199
Thus, a compromissory clause is part of many treaties relating to
the law of the sea, whereby parties agree to take any dispute arising from
the interpretation of the treaties in question to an international
tribunal. 200 Conventions adopted under the auspices of the International
Maritime Organization contain provisions to submit disputes to the
International Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal. 201 In general,
under UNCLOS III, articles 280 and 282, dispute settlement methods are
left to be decided by the parties involved, 20 2 but provision is made for
systems of dispute resolution. These are the International Court of
Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, an international
arbitral tribunal, and a special technical arbitral tribunal. 20 3 Arbitration is
required when disputing parties have not accepted the same
198. Sara M. Mitchell & Brandon C. Prins, Beyond Territorial Contiguity: An Examination
of the Issues Underlying Democratic Interstate Disputes, 43 INT'L STUDIES Q. 169, 169-83 (1999).
The authors find that maritime, fisheries, or navigation issues account for nearly half of all
militarized disputes between democracies since World War II.
199. UNCLOS III, supra note 19, pt. XI, § 5.
200.

Louis B. SOHN & KRISTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN A NUTSHELL 238

(1984).
201. Id. at 238, 239.
202. Id. at 241.
203. UNCLOS III, supra note 19, art. 287(1).
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procedure. 2°4 Guidance on selection of an arbitral tribunal is provided in
Annex VII to the Convention. 205
Experience indicates that resorting to an international
commission to settle disputed matters, although not binding on the
parties to the dispute, usually proves successful. 206 Nevertheless,
commentators have pointed out the incompatibility of international law
with the doctrine of state sovereignty. 2 7 Although it is paradoxical to
expect sovereign states to submit to the will of another state (or states),
bilateral or multilateral agreements with a minimum of ambiguity were
indeed necessary in governing the resources of the sea. Justiciable
questions pertaining to the interpretation or application of international
law are considered to have a legal basis and are best served by binding
adjudication, whereas disputes arising from disregarding a law or from
the desire to change the law are assumed to be politically motivated and
208
nonjusticiable.
To equitably resolve disputes and balance the various rights
involved, the Hague Convention on Pacific Settlement of Disputes of
1907 recognized the need for "an impartial and conscientious
investigation" to aid in fact finding prior to resolution.2°9 When
diplomatic negotiations fail, a state that is not involved in the dispute, or
a prominent international official, may offer "good offices" as an
intermediary to assist in settlement of the dispute.210 If the role of the
intermediary grows to an active position in the settlement, the process
becomes a mediation.211 When the mediator is an independent body
rather than a noninvolved state or prominent official, the process is
termed a conciliation. The recommendations following a conciliation are
nonbinding, in contrast to those of binding arbitration where the
212
settlement of an issue is undertaken by a judge.
Issues vary in their suitability to these methods of dispute
settlement, and, although the courts are accepted as being the most
formal and juridical, their opinion is occasionally disregarded or

204. Id. art. 287(5).
205. Id.
206. SOHN & GUSTAFSON, supranote 200.
207. CLINGAN, supranote 49, at 517.
208. Id. at 519.
209. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes [Hague, I], pt III,
Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 9 (Multilateral), 36 Stat. 2199; CHARLES I.
BEVANS, 1 TREATIES & OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 587 (1968).
210. CLINGAN, supra note 49, at 520.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 523, 524.
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suspected of partiality. 213 When tribunals are called to interpret a treaty
or to balance conflicting claims, they too need to exhibit fairness and
impartiality and "be willing to brave political displeasure, searching
always for generalizable principles, even as they search for formulations
or procedural mechanisms to render the principles more palatable to the
states concerned." 214 In rendering the principles "palatable" to the states,
legal scholars have suggested that tribunals build on existing consensus
or, when there is no consensus, follow a generalized path to encourage
215
further negotiation and refrain from establishing detailed guidelines.
The benefit of a tribunal's availability as a forum is the speed with which
216
critical conservation issues can be settled.
The existence of varied fora for dispute resolution has been
criticized by some for introducing fragmentation to a process that ought
to be streamlined and uniform. 217 However, it is precisely this choice of
forum that has the potential to encourage swift and relatively
noncontentious settlement of the disputes that will inevitably continue to
arise among states forced to share dwindling resources.
A. The Swordfish Cases
A dispute rooted in the issue of court jurisdiction arose in the
late 1990s when European Union (EU) fishing fleets began to hunt
swordfish over the Nazca Ridge in the Southeast Pacific. 218 Swordfish
(Xiphias gladius) are a migratory species found in the tropical and
temperate seas of the world, from approximately 45 degrees north to 45
degrees south.219 Because of their far ranging travels, the fish cross the
jurisdictional boundaries of several countries, and this allows for the
argument that they are a common resource open to all and thus must be
protected for future generations. Chile, to protect the swordfish in its
EEZ and adjacent high seas, has enacted several regulations for
213. Id. at 526.
214. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 314 (1997).
215. Id. at 314.
216. Id. at 327.
217. See Peggy Rodgers Kalas & Alexia Herwig, Dispute Resolution under the Kyoto
Protocol, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 130 (2000).
218. MARCOS ORELLANA CRUZ, INTL CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE
SWORDFISH IN PERIL: THE EU CHALLENGES CHILEAN PORT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS AT THE
WTO, in BRIDGES: BETWEEN TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (July-Aug. 2000),

availableat http://www.ictsd.org/English/BRIDGES4-6.pdf (last visited May 17, 2004).
219. JEAN MCCRAE, OR. DEP'T OF FISH &WILDLIFE, OREGON DEVELOPMENTAL SPECIES:
SWORDFISH, XIPHIAS GLADIUS, available at http://www.hmsc.orst.edu/odfw/devfish/sp/

sword.html (last visited May 17, 2004).
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conservation that specify what gear is to be used and that halt the
issuance of new permits. 220 In addition to limiting the size of the fish that
can be caught to 106 cm, Chilean Fisheries Law, article 162 states that
Chilean ports are not open to factory ships and EU longliners 221 that
222
disregard the catch regulations.
To settle the dispute that arose, the EU chose to take its case to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the belief that the WTO was a
better forum because (1) the dispute was about jurisdictional rather than
environmental issues, i.e., Chile's interpretation of an EEZ; (2) the WTO
could enforce a positive judgment for the EU by imposing retaliatory
measures; and (3) the WTO has tighter time limits for dispute
223
resolution.
The European Union contended that the Chilean regulations
violated article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), which allows free transit of goods along contracting parties'
territories. 224 In addition, the EU argued that because its ships were
prevented from landing in Chilean ports, they were unable to process
and ship the fish to markets in the United States and other North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) states, thus violating article
XI of GATT, which prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports or
exports.225
The right of access to the ports of a foreign country is governed
by that foreign country, since a sovereign nation can determine which
non-native ships may have access to its ports. This international norm
was upheld in an International Court of Justice (ICJ) case involving
Nicaragua and the United States, where the ICJ stated, "by virtue of its
sovereignty.. .the coastal State may regulate access to its ports."226 Since

220. CRUZ, supra note 218, at 12 n.1.
221. Longliners are vessels that drag a long fishing line (several miles in length) baited
with hundreds of hooks. NAT. RESOURCES DE. COUNCIL, SWORDFISH IN THE NORTH
ATLANTIC: THE CASE FOR CONSERVATION (1998), available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife
/fish/rnasword.asp#intro (last visited May 17, 2004).
222. CRUZ, supra note 218, at 11.
223. RISA SCHWARTZ, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., FORUM SHOPPING?, in
BRIDGES: BETWEEN TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 12 (July-Aug. 2000), available at
http://www.ictsd.org/English/BRIDGES4-6.pdf (last visited May 17, 2004).
224. Marcos Orellana, The EU and Chile Suspend the Swordfish Case Proceedings at the WVTO
and the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 2001, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh60.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
225. Press Release, EUROPA, EU and Chile Reach an Amicable Settlement to End
WTO/ITLOS Swordfish Dispute (Jan. 25, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
fisheries/news-corner/press/inf0_05_en.htm (last visited May. 17 2004).
226. Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States), 1986, I.C.J. 14, at 111 (June27).
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article V has never been applied to fisheries or to port access for fishing
boats -issues more commonly dealt with by customary law and bilateral
lex specialis,
treaties -it could be claimed that article V should be made a 227
ports.
its
over
control
total
an exception to the law of a state's
An additional consideration for port access is that article 23(3) of
the 1995 U.N. Agreement on the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks allows a state
to forbid a foreign fishing boat from landing if the boat has caught the
fish in a manner that violates the state's multilateral conservation
measures. While not a signatory to this agreement, Chile is a member of
2
This
the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific (CPPS).
measures
organization has enacted several multilateral conservation
and, since 1952, has worked to make the EEZ an international customary
norm. 229 On August 14, 2000, the CPPS agreed to the creation of
conservation measures for marine resources that are highly migratory
(Galapagos Agreement). 230 Had Chile made the argument that its actions
in CPPS were similar to what would have been required of it under the
Straddling Fish Stocks agreement, it may have been successful.
Chile, in response to the EU's actions, brought the case to ITLOS
and sought to use that organization's dispute settlement mechanism.
Chile stated that the issue before ITLOS was whether the EU had
complied with UNCLOS article 64 (regarding cooperation with coastal
states in managing conservation of migratory and straddling stocks in
EEZ waters), articles 116-119 (regarding conservation and management
of the living resources of the high seas), article 297 (pertaining to dispute
settlement), and article 300 (pertaining to good faith and not abusing
rights). 231 In addition, Chile asked the tribunal to find that the EU had
not enacted proper methods for conservation because it allowed the use
of longlines on its boats and it failed to report its catches to the Food and
232
Agriculture Organization.
The European Union agreed to have the case heard before ITLOS
but, along with Chile, asked that a special chamber be formed because
23 3
ITLOS as a whole lacked the jurisdiction to hear the case. This was
formed. 234
was
chamber
five-judge
agreed to by Chile, and the special
227. CRUZ, supra note 218, at 11.
228. Id. The organization's members are Ecuador, Peru, Columbia, and Chile.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 11-12.
231. Concerning Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. European Community) 2000 I.T.L.O.S. 3 (Dec. 20).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Orellana, supra note 224.
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The EU then requested the tribunal to find that Chile had violated all of
the UNCLOS articles previously stated, as well as article 87 (specifying
that coastal states may not unjustifiably interfere with the freedoms,
including fishing, of a ship on the high seas) and article 89 (asserting that
high seas are open to all, subject to conservation regulations, and cannot
be controlled by any state). 235 In addition, the EU argued that Chile was
exercising excessive control over its EEZ and that its actions with the
CPPS in the Galapagos Agreement were improper because interested
states, other than the members of the CPPS, were not permitted to
236
attend.
The two questions facing ITLOS were (1) whether to use
environmental law to interpret UNCLOS articles and (2) how much
control a state can project beyond its borders onto the high seas. With
respect to the first question, the ITLOS judgment in the Southern BlueFin Tuna Cases (discussed below) indicated that the tribunal was aware
of a need to have a general rule that could be applied to the management
of all fisheries. That case showed that scientific uncertainty about the
proper means to preserve the tuna had caused the dispute, prompting
the court to require that provisional measures be enacted to preserve
existing stocks. In the case before the special chamber, therefore, it would
be hoped that the justices note this (nonbinding) precedent or use the
same reasoning to protect the swordfish.
The ICJ has recognized that there is emerging customary law
requiring that states respect the environment beyond areas of national
control. 237 States also have the duty to respect the interests of other states
when exercising fishing rights under the Convention on the High Seas. 238
Precedent therefore suggests that ITLOS would have to decide if
longlines, which are non-discriminatory and catch not just adult
swordfish but also sub-legal immature swordfish, tuna, marlins, sailfish,
sharks, pilot whales, migratory leatherback turtles, and albatross
seabirds in great numbers, 239 allow a state to respect the environment
and meet its obligations under international law. Chile would probably
argue that since the high seas are a sort of global common space, the
235. Id.
236. Lesley Murphy, EC and Chile Reach Agreement on 10-Year Swordfish Dispute, INT-FISH
BULL. No. 4 (2001), at http://www.oceanlaw.net/bulletin/sample/focus/O1O2c.htm (last
visited Aug. 24, 2004).
237. Advisory Opinion No. 95, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 66, at 141 (July 8).
238. Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 3, at 22 (July 25).
239.

NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COuNcrL, SWORDFISH IN THE NORTH ATLANTIc: THE CASE FOR

CONSERVATION (1998), at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/fish/masword.asp
Aug. 24, 2004).

(last visited
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environmental norms become obligations erga omnes, i.e., universally
applicable. 240 Not only do coastal states need to speak on the issue of the
protection of the high seas, but non-coastal states have a right to as well,
even though the high seas are far beyond their areas of national
control. 241
It would have been interesting to see what ITLOS would have
decided, but Chile and the EU halted the proceedings in the last week of
January 2001, creating a provisional agreement that became operational
days from January 1, 2004, to
in March 2001.242 The parties were given 90
243
make objections regarding the agreement.
While this case has essentially ended, it brings to light another
III, that no international council exists with the ability
UNCLOS
of
flaw
or to handle all disputes regarding the
decisions
to enforce its
above case, the EU took the dispute to the
the
In
management of the seas.
WTO arguing that this was a purely economic matter. Chile, on its part,
took the case to ITLOS, arguing that it was an environmental matter. If
there were a single court to hear all disputes, there would be no
argument about the lack of jurisdiction. This issue reemerges in the
Southern Blue-Fin Tuna Cases discussed below.
B. The Southern Blue-Fin Tuna Cases
New Zealand and Australia sought adjudication against Japan
for violating UNCLOS III articles 64 and 116-119 dealing with the
244
conservation and management of fish stocks. The experimental fishing
program and the total allowable catch number were the issues keeping
245
the two sides from reaching an agreement. Japan maintained that since
it engaged in an experimental fishing program to assess the viability of
the stock, the dispute was scientific rather than legal. The factor that
made this case difficult to resolve was that science could provide no
answer as to what methods were necessary to preserve the southern
240. Orellana, supra note 224.
241. Id.
242. Press Release, Int'l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Provisional Agreement
Reached Between Parties-President of the Special Chamber Extends Time-Limits (Mar. 21,
2001), available at http://www.itlos.org/news/press-release/2001/press-release_45_en.
doc (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
243. Id.
244. S. Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624, at 162729 (1999).
245. Japan argued that New Zealand and Australia had not discussed every single
possible procedure to settle the dispute as required under Part XV, Section 1 of UNCLOS
III and requested a provisional measure requiring both to recommence negotiations. S.
Bluefin Tuna, 38 I.L.M. at 1630, 1633 (1999).
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blue-fin tuna, what catch rate would allow the stock to remain strong
enough to survive and, most importantly, what was the sustainable yield
of the tuna. 246 In view of the scientific debate, ITLOS recognized the
uncertainty involved in the issue. 247 The tribunal ordered the parties (1)
to avoid aggravation of the dispute, (2) to reasonably carry out the
decision, (3) to set the total allowable catch at levels last agreed upon by
the disputants, (4) to refrain from an experimental fishing program
unless the disputants mutually agree upon one, (5) to resume
negotiations in order to reach agreement on conservation and
management measures of southern blue-fin tuna, and (6) to make
additional efforts to reach agreements with other states regarding
conservation and management of southern blue-fin tuna.248 ITLOS also
provided for interim measures until all points were in place. 249 Though
the disputants were now able to proceed to arbitration, 25 0 the problem of
scientific uncertainty was not addressed.
The troubles between New Zealand/Australia and Japan were
not over. The arbitration panel agreed with Japan that ITLOS did not
have jurisdiction, an action that canceled the interim measures. 251 A
settlement was finally reached when all sides agreed to continue fishing,
subject to the scientific data produced by a third party regarding catch
size and the fishing program.252 This agreement has also been used to
force New Zealand to lift a ban on whaling. 2 3 It is noteworthy that the
arbitration panel rejected a binding decision by ITLOS, and the two sides
were forced to renegotiate a settlement. In addition, the arrangement did
not solve the underlying disagreements and the dispute continues 25 4 and
will probably not end until the science can become more exact.
C. Customary Law/Compulsory Adjudication
In a case seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the
funding of the "Contras" in Nicaragua, 25 5 the U.S. Court of Appeals in
the District of Columbia Circuit made clear its position that "no
246. Id. at 1634.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1635-36.
249. Id. at 1635.
250. Id. at 1634.
251. Japan to Conduct Joint Tuna Research with Australia, N.Z., JAPAN EcON. NEWSWIRE,
Nov. 27, 2000.
252. Id.
253. Jonathan Milne, Tuna Pact Stirs Other Tensions, DOMINION, Dec. 26, 2000, at 2.
254. Id.
255. Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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enactment of Congress can be challenged on the ground that it violates
customary international law." 256 Peremptory norms may enjoy the
highest status within international law, but the court rejected appellants'
257
assertion that such norms rise to the level of constitutional obligations.
Until such time as the Regulations enjoy widespread acceptance
and the international community as a whole conforms to provisions
therein, the Seabed Authority cannot claim that the Regulations rise to
the level of peremptory norms. In the Nicaraguacase, the court, quoting
25 8
from Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, noted that customary
international law requires consistent practice that arises out of states'
sense of legal obligation. And again, quoting from the ICJ, the court
29
noted that state practice must be "extensive and virtually uniform." 5 In
addition, for a customary norm to rise to the peremptory norm level, the
international community must accept it as "a norm from which no
26
derogation is permitted." 0
It must also be noted that fewer than a third of the U.N. member
nations agree to compulsory adjudication, raising the question of
whether the ICJ or ITLOS will have any real authority to prosecute cases
arising from seabed disputes. As in the fisheries cases discussed above,
the likelihood remains that ICJ orders will be found to be arbitrary or
unreasonable by either party to a dispute. Commentators have noted
that the existence of compulsory third-party adjudication may, at the
261
very least, retard claims of ownership over international resources. As
such, the provisions for third-party adjudication within the Regulations
would have the felicitous effect of limiting disputes and leading
conflicting entities to good faith negotiation in an effort to reach
agreement. It remains to be seen whether this expectation will indeed
materialize. Although the case between the EU and Chile did indeed
reach provisional agreement, this has not always been the case in either
territorial 262 or fisheries 263 disputes.
Some commentators are troubled by the fact that dispute
resolutions may involve adjudicators who are not entirely independent,
256. Id. at 939.
257. Id. at 940.
258. Section 102(2) (1987).
259. N. Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federated Republic of Germany v. Denmark;
Federated Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 43 (Feb. 20) (judgment).
260. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and InternationalOrganizations
or Between International Organizations,U.N. Doc. A/CN.129/15, art. 53 (1986).
261. John E. Noyes, Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675, 683 (1989).
262. For example, the Greek/Turkish conflict over Cyprus.
263. For example, the dispute between Iceland/Norway and Japan/Australia.
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as befits third-party adjudication. 264 Others point to the necessity of
allowing state interests to have some input in any international dispute,
this being "a divided and heterogeneous world." 265 What is important is
to keep the channels of communication open 266 among the various states
in order to both settle disputes and improve upon the Regulations.
Technological progress mandates international negotiations and
the creation of international fora for dispute settlements. This fact is
implicitly recognized by UNCLOS III and has been variously
implemented by the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer and the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities. 267 Joint ownership of the deep seabed by the
global community, 268 in addition to presenting adjudication difficulties,
serves to deter private investment by individual states that would
improve technological capabilities of exploration and extraction of
mineral resources. There is no incentive to develop a resource that will
be claimed by others. Depressed metals prices and adequate land-based
supply present a further disincentive to deep seabed mining.
Nevertheless, a fluctuating global economy and the impermanence of
supply level calculations make assumptions regarding the presumed
futility of seabed mining especially treacherous. Accordingly, the move
to replace the unbounded freedom to claim deep seabed resources by
any single state with the collective rights of the international community
is a move in the right direction. The ISA Regulations provide a
framework to establish and protect those rights. In addition to ensuring
that economic gain from a common resource does not unfairly accrue to
a single entity, the Regulations prevent exploitation of deep seabed
resources to the detriment of the environment. In fact, even if division
among states-a method suggested for claiming Antarctic oil
reserves269-were adopted for development of the deep seabed, ISA
Regulations are a step ahead since they include area limits and
requirements for such development with an aim to preserve intact the
seabed territories as far as possible.
264. GURDIP SINGH, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 61 (1985); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY:
EXAMINING THE RIDDLE OF ONE LAW IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 212-98 (1968).

265.

Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public

InternationalLaw, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 70 (1982).

266. Noyes, supra note 261, at 694.
267. Id. at 695.
268. UNCLOS III, supranote 19, art. 136.
269. Joseph J. Ward, Black Gold in a White Wilderness - Antarctic Oil: The Past, Present, and
Potential of a Region in Need of Sovereign Environmental Stewardship, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 363, 386 (1998).
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Inasmuch as self-regulation evidences a maturing in the
management of the world's resources by the international community,
the effort should be supported by the United States and other countries
that have not yet ratified UNCLOS III. Arguably, inadequacies in the
lawmaking effort can be better improved from within. In any case,
regulation of deep seabed mining activity outside the EEZ of coastal
states is now a reality for the international community. And although
270
skepticism abounds regarding the profitability of nodule mining, in
2001 the ISA granted exploration contracts in the eastern equatorial
271
Should the regime
Pacific to seven groups of pioneer investors.
developed by the ISA prove unsatisfactory -and there is, as yet, no
indication that it will-it can be improved. The regulatory machinery
presents a complex picture, as would any emergent legislation of
worldwide scope that needs to impose order on such a multitude of
factors, but it is much preferable to the chaotic system of clashing
independent interests that existed previously.
Past failures in the application of customary international law
underscored the frozen nature of the disorder and the unyielding
problem in need of a solution. Having overcome objections and
instituted a plan for prospecting and exploration acceptable to
international consortia, the ISA is now capable of influencing opinion should any state remain reluctant to follow the Regulations, perceiving
them as a curb in its degree of freedom. This alone suggests reason for
optimism. Even if not immediately embraced, regulatory restraint is a
mandatory solution to preserving and optimizing resources of the deep
sea. Achieving comity at the international level may be challenging but is
nevertheless tenable. The philosophy of the ISA Regulations is premised
on both our common heritage and our272environmental obligations, which
require cooperation on a global basis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the common heritage of mankind, the deep seabed merits
careful management and an argument can be made that the United
States must yield to international pressure and assist U.N. efforts to craft
a solution. Isolationist policies neglect current geopolitical realities. The
foregoing appraisal of the law of the sea pertaining to the deep seabed
indicates that customary law is evolving and capable of keeping pace
270. G.P. Glasby, Economic Geology: Lessons Learnedfrom Deep-Sea Mining, 289 Sci. 551-53
(2000).
271. Peter A. Rona, Resources of the Sea Floor, 299 SCI. 673-74 (2003).
272. UNCLOS III, supra note 19, pt. XV, art. 197.
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with progressing technology. Though the ISA Regulations impose a
sizeable financial obligation on the states sponsoring deep seabed
mining activity, they are reasonable and should be acceptable to the U.S.
government. The United States enjoys unprecedented technological and
economic advantages and is therefore eminently able to commit to the
precautionary environmental policies such as those promulgated by the
ISA Regulations. The crucial point is to recognize the truth encapsulated
in the observation that, "[ajlthough the scientists have seen the sea as a
biological whole for a long time, policy makers and lawyers still attempt
to place their policies and legal drafts into neat compartments." 273 As
compartmentalization of ocean policy progresses, the challenge to
preserve the integrity of the seas and the resources of the deep seabed is
intensified.
Preserving the deep-sea marine environment is all the more
critical because of the extreme diversity of species present on the seabed,
"rivaling that of coral reefs and rainforests." 274 The
ubiquitous
polymetallic manganese nodule itself has been characterized as "a black
box [containing] the story of the history of the sea" 275 and should be
accorded the study it deserves. Perhaps, therefore, it is propitious that
the global economic climate is not conducive to mining of the deep
seabed at present and that further scientific and technological
improvements need to be made in order to best protect the seabed. As
ISA Secretary-General Satya N. Nandan observed in the opening of the
proceedings at the Ninth Session, the difficulty in assessing available
ocean mineral resources is due to the fact that "the water is very
transparent but the ocean is very opaque." 276
Delaying mining activity will allow the ISA to get its affairs in
order, i.e., to make good progress in its work of responsibly managing
the mineral resources of the international seabed area and to succeed in
its stated aim to become a depositary of scientific data. Protection of the
deep seabed environment, however, cannot rely on regulation alone but
needs international collaboration in monitoring scientific research and
commercial mining activities along with strict enforcement of
environmental regulations.
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